On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On June 23, the New York County Supreme Court issued a rare preliminary injunction temporarily halting a mezzanine lender’s UCC foreclosure sale of the Mark Hotel in New York City because the procedures for the foreclosure sale were not commercially reasonable in light of conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (D2 Mark LLC v. Orei VI Investments LLC, 2020 WL 3432950 (2020)).

NEW YORK – On Nov. 29, 2016, the plaintiffs, Anna and Guido Nocelli, both citizens of New York, filed an action in the Supreme Court of New York alleging 11 causes of action related to Anna Nocelli’s, alleged asbestos-related disease. The initial complaint named multiple defendants, including the Union Carbide Corp., that were citizens of New York.

In preparing a merchant cash advance (MCA) agreement on behalf of the provider, there is constant tension between the urge to include every conceivable contractual right for protecting the provider’s economic interests and the need to avoid language that might reorder the parties’ relationship in a way that renders the entire agreement unenforceable. Deciding how to address the possibility that the merchant might pursue bankruptcy poses a particularly challenging dilemma.

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

The Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County, recently granted a foreclosing plaintiff summary judgment and held that plaintiff did not need to send a 90-day notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 because plaintiff was not a lender, assignee, or mortgage loan servicer. SeeNIC Holding Corp. v. Eisenegger, 59 Misc. 3d 1221(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). In the case, one of plaintiff’s employees was relocating and defendant wanted to purchase the employee’s home.

In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.

Background

The New York Court of Appeals decision on April 5, in the Midland Insurance Company liquidation (In re Liquidation of Midland Insurance Company1) is an important affirmation of policyholder rights. In this decision, New York’s highest court held that a policyholder is entitled to a claim and policy-specific choice of law analysis in the liquidation process, rejecting the Midland liquidator’s effort to make a blanket application of New York law to Midland’s 38,000 policyholders.

Plaintiff White Mountains Re, successor in interest to MONY Re, filed an action in the New York Supreme Court against Travelers asserting claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract arising out of a dispute concerning certain reinsurance contracts. Travelers removed the action to the US District Court for the Southern District of New York and subsequently filed a motion to transfer this action to the District of Connecticut.

In somewhat related news, in two recent New York Supreme Court rulings, judges upheld the validity of “bad boy” guarantees that included as non-recourse exceptions or “bad boy” acts under the guarantee a voluntary bankruptcy filing by the borrower.